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NOTES
THE CEMENT DECISION' AND BASING-POINT.
PRICING SYSTEMS
The period since the end of World War II has been marked by a tre-
mendous volume of litigation arising under the federal anti-trust statutes. One
of the Government's principal attacks has been aimed at the basing-point
system of pricing which has been employed in many basic industries.2 This
attack marked no new departure on the part of the Government; the Federal
Trade Commission has consistently opposed the system, 3 and the courts have
repeatedly been called upon to review Commission orders aimed at some
feature of the basing-point system.4
Until recently the system had successfully withstood these attacks. It had
weathered a number of proceedings under the Sherman and Clayton Acts.5
A provision which would have definitely outlawed it was stricken from the
1. Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 68 Sup. Ct. 793 (1948). In this
case the Federal Trade Commission had found that there was an agreement or under-
standing among the members of the cement industry to utilize a multiple basing-point
system in the sale of cement. The Court upheld the Commission's findings and order
requiring the cement manufacturers to cease and desist from said practice. This case will
hereinafter be referred to as the Cement case. An earlier case against the predecessor of
the present Cement Institute will be referred to as the Old Cement case. [Cement Mfrs.
Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 588, 45 Sup. Ct. 586, 69 L. Ed. 1104 (1925)].
2. Basing-point pricing systems have generally been employed in the maple-flooring,
zinc, copper, industrial-benzol, gasoline, cement, southern-pine, oak-flooring, lead, steel,
potash and sugar industries. NELSON AND Kum, PRICE BEHAVIOR AND BUSINESS POLICY
345 (TNEC Monograph 1, 1940). The system has also been employed in selling asphalt
shingles and roofing, industrial alcohol, fertilizers, sewer pipe, range boilers, hollow
building tile, metal lath, nuts, bolts and rivets. FTTER, THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY
242 (1931). See also BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 291-299 (1936).
3. As early as 1924 the FTC issued a cease-and-desist order aimed at Pittsburgh-Plus,
the early manifestation of the basing-point system in the steel industry. Matter of United
States Steel Corp., 8 F. T. C. 1 (1924). See FTC, PRICE BASES INQUIRY (1932). Re-
spondent Marquette Cement Co., in the Cement case urged that the Commission's reports
to the President, and testimony of Commission members before congressional committees
showed a previously developed bias and prejudice against the system. 68 Sup. Ct. at 803.
This contention received the sympathetic consideration of the lower court, which, how-
ever, held that no denial of due process was involved. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 147 F. 2d 589 (C. C. A. 7th 1945). Other instances of FTC
condemnation of the system may be found in Matter of United States Maltsters Ass'n,
35 F. T. C. 797 (1942) ; Matter of Hardwood Institute, 34 F. T. C. 661 (1942) ; Matter
of Pine Hill Lime & Stone Co., 33 F. T. C. 427 (1941). Charges have been filed against
a number of other groups. U. S. News, May 7, 1948, p. 47.
4. Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746, 65 Sup. Ct.
971, 89 L. Ed. 1338 (1945) ; Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
324 U. S. 726, 65 Sup. Ct. 961, 89 L. Ed. 1320 (1945) ; Sugar Institute v. United States,
297 U. S. 553, 56 Sup. Ct. 629, 80 L. Ed. 859 (1936) ; Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n
v. United States, 268 U. S. 588. 45 Sup. Ct. 586, 69 L. Ed. 1104 (1925) ; Maple Flooring
Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 45 Sup. Ct. 578, 69 L. Ed. 1093 (1925)
The most recent Supreme Court work in the general field of anti-trust problems is
discussed in 17 U. S. L. WVEEK 3017 (July 6, 1948).
5. Sugar Institute v. United States; Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States;
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, all supra note 4.1 63
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Robinson-Patman Act 6 before it was passed.7 Two bills aimed solely at out-
lawing the basing-point method were introduced in Congress, 8 but neither
was passed. However, in 1945 the system suffered a major set-back in the
courts when the Supreme Court upheld the findings of the Federal Trade
Commission and ruled that the basing-point system as employed by two major
manufacturers of glucose resulted in illegal price discrimination.9 Then, in
the recent case of Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute,10 the Court
hAnded down a decision which may well mean the end of the system as now
developed, unless Congress comes to its aid. It is the purpose here to examine
the Cetent decision to determine how it fits in with established anti-trust
policy and previous decisions dealing with the basing-point system, and to
consider some of its possible results."
I. THE BASING-POINT SYSTEI
In order to understand the bases for the attacks upon the basing-point
system one must first understand its essential features.'2 Under the system,
sellers quote only delivered prices ;13 these prices are computed by adding
together the price of the product at a specified point and freight rates from
that point to the customer. The specified point is called a basing-point. It may
or may not be the situs of the seller's plant, and indeed it sometimes happens
6. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1941).
7. The provision in question read as follows: "(5) That the word 'price' as used in
section 2 shall be construed to mean the amount received by the vendor after deducting
freight or other transportation, if any, allowed or defrayed by the vendor." 80 CoNG.
REC. 8224 (1936). If this provision had been retained, sellers would have been forced
to quote prices f.o.b. the mill, thus destroying the basing-point system. Id. at 8223.
8. 80 CONG. REc. 8223-8224 (1936).
9. Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746, 65 Sup. Ct.
971, 89 L. Ed. 1338 (1945) ; Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
324 U. S. 726, 65 Sup. Ct. 961, 89 L. Ed. 1320 (1945).
10. 68 Sup. Ct. 793 (1948).
11. No attempt will be made in this note to analyze or consider in detail the effect
of the Cement decision upon other types of delivered-price systems-zone prices and
universal delivered prices-though unquestionably they are related to the basing-point
system, and are in some degree subject to the same legal considerations. See p. 81 in ra.
12. There is an extensive literature on the subject. For a more complete discussion of
the functioning of the system see BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 290-371 (1936) ;
FETTER, THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY 145-163 (1931); MILLER, UNFAIR COMPETITION
172-190 (1941); THE BASING POINT PROBLEM (TNEC Monograph 42, 1941); 3
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, TNEC PAPERS: THE BASING POINT METHOD 1-14
(1940) ; Aulette and Schaffer, Legality of the "Basing Point" Pricing Systemn, 33 GEO.
L. J. 439 (1945) ; Clark, Basing Point Methods of Price Quoting, 4 CAN. J. OF ECON. &
POL. ScI. 477 (1938) ; Withrow, Basng-Point and Freiqht-Zone Price Systems Under
the Anjti-Trust Laws, 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 690 (1937) ; Notes, The Legality of Basing-
Point Systems, 45 HARV. L. REv. 548 (1932) ; Basing-Point Pricing and Antitrust
Policy, 55 YALE L. J. 558 (1946).
13. This is the ideal situation, from the point of view of the basing-point proponent.
This "ideal" is not always attained, and from time to time there may be some quotation
of prices f.o.b. a mill. Evidence of this situation in the cement industry was produced
in the Cement case. 68 Sup. Ct. at 811. The FTC failed to find that respondents
had refused to make such sales. Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 157 F. 2d 533, 541 (C. C. A. 7th 1946).
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that no one manufactures the particular product at the basing-point. 14 When
all sellers use one basing-point, the industry is said to operate under a single
basing-point system.15 When, as in the cement industry, a number of different
basing-points are used, the industry is said to operate under a multiple basing-
point system.' 6 The base prices at these different points may be identical,
or there may be a considerable differential in particular instances. 17 Under
the multiple system, the delivered price which any seller will quote to a buyer
is the lowest combination of base price plus freight from that basing-point
to the buyer. 18 These freight rates are generally made available to all sellers
in some planned manner, through a trade association or other agency, and are
not left to individuals to ascertain as best they may.19 Since all sellers who
adopt the system will use the same figures in computing their bids or offers
to pi-ospective buyers, the method results in absolute identity of quoted prices,
regardless of the relative production costs and relative locations of the various
sellers with respect to the particular buyer. When sellers quote identical de-
livered prices, but incur different transportation costs, it necessarily follows
that there is a difference in the net mill price which each seller' would receive
from a particular buyer-the seller having lowest transportation costs, i.e.,
normally the one nearest the buyer, receiving the highest mill net. Thus, as
applied to one buyer and several sellers, the system results in identity of de-
livered prices, and variation in net mill return to the several sellers. It is this
identity of quoted delivered price, resulting from a common use of factors
which are not related to the individual seller's costs, which is the basis of the
attacks upon the system as being a type of monopolistic price-fixing.
14. 3 UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, TNEC PAPERS: THE BASING POINT
METHOD 2 (1940).
15. The most famous of the single basing-point systems was that developed in the
steel industry and known as Pittsburgh-Plus. For a time, practically all the steel in the
United States was sold on the basis of the Pittsburgh price plus freight from Pittsburgh
to the buyer, regardless of where the steel was manufactured. See generally, DAUGHERTY,
DE CHAZEAU, STRATTON, THE EcoNoMIcs OF THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY 533-544(1937); Commons, The Delivered Piice Practice in the Steel iarket, 14 Am. EcoN.
REV. 505 (1924). The system was condemned as a violation of the Clayton and Federal
Trade Commission Acts in Matter of United States Steel Corp., 8 F. T. C. 1 (1924) ;
see Mechem, The "Pittsburgh Plis" Case, 10 A. B. A. J. 806 (1924). Other industries
using a single basing-point were maple flooring, zinc, copper, industrial behzol, and
gasoline. NELSON AND KEIR!, PRICE BEHAVIOR AND BUSINESS POLICY 345 (TNEC Mono-
graph 1, 1940).
16. Multiple basing-points have been used in the cement, pulp, southern-pine, oak-
flooring, lead, steel, potash and sugar industries. Ibid.
17. 3 UNITED STATES STEEL CORP., TNEC PAPERS: THE BASING POINT METHOD
18 (1940).
18. E.g., if the base price at basing-point A is $5.00, and freight from A to the
buyer is $1.00, the price computed from point A would be $6.00. If the base price at
basing-point B is $4.50 and freight from B to the same buyer is $1.25, the price from
point B would be $5.75. In such a case all sellers would quote the lower price, $5.75,
and point B would be the basing-point which governed prices in the buyer's vicinity.
19. The cases cited in note 4 supra. describe the activities of trade associations in
this respect. The practice of distributing base price information through trade association
channels renders the association particularly vulnerable to charges of concerted price-
fixing, and has been generally abandoned.
1948 ] NO TES
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
As applied to one seller and several buyers, the system results in a varia-
tion in the mill net which is received from the several buyers. 20 This feature
of the system is particularly striking in the case of a non-base mill, for not only
does the mill receive a different mill net from each buyer, but the buyers also
benefit from nearness to the basing-point rather than from nearness to the
producing seller. For example, in the case of Federal Trade Commission v.
A. E. Staley Mfg. Co.,21 the Staley Company manufactured glucose at
Decatur, Illinois, and sold it at prices computed on Chicago as a basing-point.
The Chicago base price was $2.09; the freight from Chicago to Decatur
was 18 cents. Thus when Staley sold to a buyer in Decatur, where the glucose
was manufactured, the delivered price was $2.09 plus $0.18, or $2.27, and as
no freight charges were actually incurred, the mill net on such sales was $2.27.
But when Staley sold to a buyer in Chicago, the delivered price was $2.09,
and the mill net, after the freight was paid, was only $1.91. The freight
charge from Chicago to Decatur, which was used in computing the delivered
price in Decatur, but which was not actually paid for transportation, is known
as "phantom freight"; it is an arbitrary burden in the form of a pricing factor
which is imposed upon a buyer who is so unfortunate as to be located near the
point of production, but away from the price basing-point. The charge from
Decatur to Chicago, which was actually paid for transportation, but which
was not used in computing the Chicago price, is known as "freight absorp-
tion"; it is a benefit which is conferred upon the buyer who happens to be
located near the basing-point. The difference in the net price which the seller
receives from various buyers by reason of "phantom freight" or "freight
absorption" is the basis of the attacks upon the system as a method of il-
legal pride discrimination.
No attempt will be made here to discuss in detail the economic advan-
tages or disadvantages of the system, important though they may be in the
ultimate determination of the legality of the system. Suffice it to say that the
friends' of the system claim that it effects an important saving in time and
effort by providing a quick convenient method of arriving at price quota-
tions; that it promotes competition by making it possible for a seller to share
in the market outside of his area of natural freight advantage; and that this
interpenetration of market areas allows greater diversification of product, and
also promotes economic stability by making a producer less subject to local
economic conditions. Opponents say that it produces economically wasteful
"cross-hauling" ;22 that it actually does not promote competition, since sellers
20. So long as a mill is a basing-point, and so long as the particular buyers are
within the area controlled by this base, mill net will be identical from all buyers, i.e., it
will amount to the base price in each instance.
21. 324 U. S. 746, 65 Sup. Ct. 971, 89 L. Ed. 1338 (1945).
22. "Cross-hauling" exists when two or more mills ship like products to customers
in each other's natural territory. For example, Mill A ships a barrel of cement to a
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who penetrate another's market sell at the other's established price; and that
it is actually a means of eliminating price competition and of stabilizing
prices at levels above those which would result from true competition.23
II. THiE ANTI-TRUST STATUTES
The statutes under which complaints or prosecutions have been brought
against the basing-point system are section 1 of the Sherman Act,24 which
outlaws combinations in restraint of trade; section 2 of the Clayton Act,25
as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,26 which makes it unlawful to dis-
criminate in price between purchasers of like grade and quality; and section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act,27 which prohibits unfair methods of
competition among the members of an industry.
Certain general observations concerning' these statutes may be helpful
in understanding why the courts have reached apparently inconsistent conclu-
sions in different cases. The Sherman Act authorizes three different types of
proceedings: (1) criminal prosecutions for misdemeanor, brought by the
Attorney-General in a federal court;28 (2) equity proceedings by the Attorney-
General to prevent and restrain violations of the Act;29 and (3) suits for
treble damages brought by persons injured by violations of the Act.30 The
Clayton Act provides for the same types of suits, and adds another which
customer located adjacent to Mill B, and Mill B ships cement, to its customer located
near Mill A.
23. Arguments pro and con the system are advanced in the materials cited in note
12 supra.
24. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
,in resfraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal." 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1941).
25. "That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly to 'discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent . . . discrimination in price in the
same or different communities made in good faith to meet competition . . . " 38 STAT.
730 (1914).
26. "[I]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . . where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with the
customers of either of them: . . . (b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a
complaint under this section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or
facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing
justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section . . .
Provided, however, That nothing contained . . . [herein] shall prevent a seller rebutting
the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price . . . was made in good
faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor . . . " 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15
U. S. C. A. § 13 (1941).
27. "Unfair methods of competition in commerce ... are hereby declared unlawful."
38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U. S. C. A. § 45 (1941).
28. Sections 2 and 3 of the Act make its violation a misdemeanor. 26 STAT. 209
(1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 2, 3 (1941).
29. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. § 4 (1941).
30. 26 STAT. 210 (1890), as amended, 15 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1941).
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applies to both Acts: an individual may bring suit to enjoin threatened loss or
damage caused by violation of the anti-trust laws.81 In addition the Clayton
Act empowered the Federal Trade Commission to act of its own motion to
enforce certain provisions of the Act, by holding administrative hearings and
issuing cease-and-desist orders in appropriate cases.3 2 Thus the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, being partially penal in character, 33 must be strictly construed.
Not so with the Federal Trade Commission Act; it may be said to be prophy-
lactic in character. It empowers the Commission to attempt to prevent prac-
tices which if left alone might lead to violation of the other Acts.34 The Com-
mission issues a complaint; holds hearings; hands down a cease-and-desist
order against improper practices; and applies to the appropriate United
States circuit court of appeals for ehforcement of the order if necessary.
Penalties are imposed under this Act only after a final order of the Com-
mission has been disobeyed.3 5
The well-recognized differences between court proceedings and admin-
istrative hearings affect the cases arising under the various acts. Those under
the Sherman and Clayton Acts which originate in a court are handled in the
ordinary way. Regular rules of evidence apply, and the trial court exercises
its normal functions. In the administrative proceedings instituted by the Com-
mission, the legal rules as to admissibility of evidence are relaxed, 0 thus
making it easier for the Commission to find that improper acts are being
done.3 7 Too, the Federal Trade Commission acts as prosecutor, judge, and
expert jury in its administrative hearings.33
Finally, it may be noted that the Sherman Act was passed before the
31. 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 26 (1941).
32. 38 STAT. 734 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 21 (1941).
33. Greer, Mills & Co. v. Stoller, 77 Fed. 1, 3 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1896); Progress
Corp. v. Green, 163 Misc. 828, 298 N. Y. Supp. 154 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (Robinson-Patman
amendment).
34. Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U. S. 457, 466,
61 Sup. Ct. 703, 85 L. Ed. 949 (1941); Butterick Pub. Co. v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 85 F. 2d 522 (C. C. A. 2d 1936).
35. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(1), 52 STAT. 114 (1938), 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 45 (1) (1941).
36. Phelps Dodge Refining Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 139 F. 2d 393
(C. C. A. 2d 1943); John Bene & Sons v. Federal Trade Commission, 299 Fed. 468,
471 (C. C. A. 2d 1924). Section 7(c) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
requires that the evidence must be "reliable, probative, and substantial." Whether this
limits an administrative body more than the previously existing rules is uncertain. The
United States Attorney-General is of the opinion that it does not. See ATrORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 76 (1948), reprinted in
15 I. C. C. PRACTITIONER'S JOURNAL (No. 5, Feb., 1948).
37. For a general discussion of the problem of judicial review of findings of fact
of the Federal Trade Commission, see Freer, An Analysis of the Federal Trade Cont-
mission Procedures as They Relate to the Administrative Prodecure Act, in THE FED-
ERAL ADMINISTRATivE'PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 414 (N. Y.
U. 1947); Hankin, Conclusiveness of the Federal Trade Commission's Findings as to
Facts, 23 MIcir. L. REv. 233 (1925); Note, Recent Trends in Interpretation of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 32 MicH. L. REV. 1142 (1934).
38. This is not a denial of due process. Federal Trade Commissioti v. F. A. Martoccio
Co., 87 F. 2d 561, 566 (C. C. A. 8th 1937), cert. denied, 301 U. S. 691 (1937).
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basing-point system had developed to an appreciable extent; 39 the Clayton
and Trade Commission Acts were passed in 1914 before widespread opposi-
tion to the system had developed; and the Robinson-Patman Act was passed
at a time when the basing-point system was the object of a special attack in the
Congress. 40
IllI. THE Cement Institute DECISION 41
The decision in the Cement case, holding the multiple basing-point sys-
tem as employed in the cement industry to be illegal, was received with con-
sternation and dismay by the cement industry.4 2 Dire predictions as to its
economic effect were immediately forthcoming.4 3 Although the dismay of the
industry may be easily understood, the result in the case should not have
been entirely unexpected. In 1924 the Federal Trade Commission, in Matter
of United States Steel Corp.,44 had found that the Pittsburgh-Plus 45 system
resulted in price discriminations among customers, and that these discrimina-
tions were neither allowed under the exceptions listed in the Clayton Act, nor
made in good faith to meet competition. It followed, and the Commission so
ruled, that Pittsburgh-Plus was an unfair discrimination which was illegal
under section 2 of the Clayton Act.46 In addition the Commission found that
the system was an unfair method of competition under section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act.47 Accordingly, the Commission ordered the
United States Steel Corporation to ceas and desist from selling its products
on the Pittsburgh-Plus basis. The Corporation then filed its answer in which
it announced that it refused to concede the validity of the order, but stated
that it would conform thereto insofar as practicable. Actually it appears that
the order simply hastened the transition from the single to the multiple basing-
39. A rudimentary basing-point structure existed in the iron industry in the 17 50's.
3 UNITED STATES STEEL CORP., TNEC PAPERS: THE BASING POINT METHOD 15 (1940).
However, the system did not develop appreciably until the late 1890's. Ibid. Professor
Fetter engagingly groups the, system together with the machine-gun, aeroplane, and
poison gas as inventions of our time. FETTER, THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY 4 (1931).
40. In 1919 organized opposition to the basing-point system arose in the form of
the Western Association of Rolled Steel Consumers, an organization whose purpose
was to bring about the abolition of Pittsburgh-Plus. FETTER, THE MASQUERADE OF
MONOPOLY 145-6 (1931). At the time the Robinson-Patman Act was being debated,
opposition to the basing-point system was sufficiently strong to cause the introduction
of legislation dealing solely with it. 80 CoNG. REc. 8224 (1936).
41. Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 68 Sup. Ct. 793 (1948). See
note 1 supra.
42. Wall Street Journal, April 27, 1948, p. 3, col. 4.
43. Time, May 10, 1948, p. 46. Decentralization of industry, local monopoly, overturn
of established cost patterns, are among general economic results predicted. U. S. News,
May 7, 1948, p. 46.
44. 8 F. T. C. 1 (1924).
45. See note 15 supra.
46. Note 25 supra.
47. Note 27 supra.
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point method of pricing in the steel industry.48 The stage was set for a pos-
sible direct ruling by the courts on the basing-point system. Nevertheless,
neither party acted; the Commission failed to apply to the courts for enforce-
ment of its order, and the Corporation failed to appeal. The explanation of
this failure to have the question adjudicated seems to be that both the Com-
mission and the Corporation were afraid to push the issue at the particular
moment. The language of the Court in the Maple Flooring49 and Old Cement 50
cases, which were decided not long after the Commission's order in the steel
case, indicated that the Court might view the basing-point practice with a
tolerant eye. On the other hand the case of United States v. American Linseed
Oil Co.,51 where the Court had looked with disfavor upon identity of delivered
prices, was of recent memory, as was the Government's attempt to dissolve
the Steel Corporation under the Sherman Act.52 Thus both parties preferred
not to press matters to a final decision before the Supreme 'Court at that
time.53
In order to determine the meaning and to evaluate the effect of the Cement
decision upon the basing-point system, it is first desirable to set out clearly
just what the case actually held. 54 The Federal Trade Commission stated its
complaint against the Cement Institute, its 74 affiliated companies, and cer-
tain individuals associated with the Institute, in two counts. The first count
alleged that respondents were guilty of practices which constituted an unfair
method of competition under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. The factual allegations to support this charge were primarily that re-
spondents had, by means of a combination among themselves, restrained and
hindered competition in the sale and distribution of cement; and that this
combination had been made effective through mutual agreement or understand-
ing to employ a multiple basing-point system of pricing. It was further alleged
that the system had resulted in the quotation of identical prices and terms of
48. BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COIPETITION 306 et seq. (1936); FETTER, THE
MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY 158-159 (1931). The Corporation admitted that it had not
completely complied with the Commission's order when it filed a petition for review of
that order in the circuit court of appeals in 1938. United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,
68 Sup. Ct. 1107, 1111 n. 4 (1948).
49. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 45 Sup. Ct. 578,
69 L. Ed. 1093 (1925).
50. Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 588, 45 Sup. Ct. 586,
69 L. Ed. 1104 (1925).
51. 262 U. S. 371, 43 Sup. Ct. 607, 67 L. Ed. 1035 (1923).
52. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct. 293, 64
L. Ed. 343 (1920).
53. FETTER, THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY 158 (1931); Note, 45 HARv. L. REv.
548 (1932).
54. There has been some confusion as to the meaning of the Court's decision. Mem-
bers of the Federal Trade Commission itself are not in agreement as to the meaning.
'Commissioner Mason declared that the decision meant that the "multiple basing point
pricing system is out as a matter of law." Commissioner Freer declared that "Certainly,
it is unwarranted to assume that the effect of this decision is to outlaw all delivered prices
or to require only f.o.b. mill prices." 10 N. A. M. LAw DIGEST 41-42 (June, 1948).
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sale for cement at any point in the United States by all of the respondents. 55
The critical points in count one are thus seen to be: (1) use of a multiple
basing-point system, (2) by mutual understanding or agreement, (3) making
effective a combination which hindered and restrained competition, (4) thereby
violating section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Count two of the complaint charged that the multiple basing-point system
of sales resulted in systematic price discriminations between the custoniers of
each respondent, and that these discriminations were made with the purpose
of destroying price competition among the respondents. 56 The essential points
of this charge are: (1) price discriminations, (2) made for the purpose of
destroying competition in violation of the Clayton Act as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act.
The Commission found the respondents guilty on both counts. This
finding was sustained by the Supreme Court, so that the holding affirms the
existence of each of the factual and legal issues presented in the counts as
enumerated above. Each of these points will now be examined separately.
A. Count 1: Violation of Federal Trade Commission Act
(1) Use of a multiple basing-point system
That the cement industry generally used a multiple basing-point system
was undisputed.57 The Commission specifically found that "Substantially all
sales of cement by the corporate respondents are made on the basis of a de-
livered price .... In determining the .delivered price whicl will be charged
for cement at any given location, respondents use a multiple basing-point
system." 58 The use of the basing-point system was attended by its natural
result-identity of delivered prices of all respondents at a given location. This
fact alone is not enough to stamp the system as illegal. In the Old Cement
case the Court found that a basing-point system was in use and that uniformity
of prices had resulted, but it also found that "uniformity has resulted not
from maintaining the price at fixed levels, but from the prompt meeting of
changes in prices by competing sellers," 59 and it therefore found nothing illegal
in the price uniformity. 'Uniformity of prices resulting from acknowledged
"price leadership" 60 is not illegal, so long as there is no agreement or under-
55. 68 Sup. Ct. at 797. The complaint before the Commission set forth- these points
and supporting facts in great detail. 37 F. T. C. 87, 96-123 (1943).
56. 68 Sup. Ct. at 797.
57. The Commission found that there was some modification of the basing-point
system by the use of a zoning system on the part of certain of the respondents. Finding
7(m), 37 F. T. C. 87, 156 (1943).
58. Finding 7(a), id. at 147.
59. Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 588, 605, 45 Sup. Ct.
586, 69 L. Ed. 1104 (1925).
60. "Price leadership" is a condition which obtains when a member of an industry-
occupies such a key position in its functions that other members tend to follow the
leader and accept prices set by the important member. Such a situation exists usually
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standing.61 In dealing with a standardized product such as cement, steel or
sugar, perfect competitive conditions would tend to produce uniformity in
price.62
(2) Mutual understanding or agreement
The Commission found that there was an agreement or understanding
among respondent mills to maintain the basing-point system,6 3 and the Su-
preme Court held that the finding was supported by the evidence." 4 In the Old
Cement case, the Court, in reversing the trial court, held that in a substan-
tially similar fact situation, no agreement was established, either directly or
by inference from existing facts.65 In that case, however, no such agreement
had been charged by the Government, so that the evidence may well not have
pointed up the possibility of concerted action. Too, as that was a prosecution
under the Sherman Act, the Court was restricted to a consideration of legally
admissible evidence presented before the trial court; whereas in the new
Cement decision the Commission was free to consider and draw inferences
from materials which might not have been available at a trial.6 6 The differences
in the form of the complaint and the nature of the original proceeding may
provide a legal basis for distinguishing the cases, but it is difficult to escape
the conclusion that the change in the personnel and philosophy of the Court
is the best explanation of how the Court found that the earlier Cement Asso-
ciation was blameless, but sustained a finding of guilt against the successor
association under circumstances of marked factual similarity.
67
Ordinarily, the mere existence of an industry-wide practice which results
in identity of prices at any given point would support a strong inference of
concerted action. However, neither economists nor the courts are agreed on
the question of whether a perfect identity of prices can result from the use
of a basing-point system without agreement or understanding. In the Old
Cement case the record showed the existence of a basing-point system and its
where smaller members fear the result of a price-cutting battle against major producers,
See BuRNs, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 76-145 (1936).
61. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693, 708-709, 47 Sup,
Ct. 748, 71 L. Ed. 1302 (1927).
62. Perfect competitive conditions do not exist under normal circumstances in in-
dustry today. See FErER, THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY 266 (1931) ; 3 UNITED STATES
STEEL CoRP., TNEC PAPERS: THE BASING POINT METHOD 20-28 (1940).
63. F. T. C. 87, 147 et seq. (1943). The finding is not spelled out, and respondents
claimed that no finding was made.
64. 68 Sup. Ct. at 812.
65. 268 U. S. 588, 606, 45 Sup. Ct. 586, 69 L. Ed. 1104 (1925).
66. See note 36 supra. An example of such evidence is the Treanor letter-a letter
written by the president of one of the respondent companies and a trustee of the Institute
to the chairman of the NRA Code Authority for the cement industry. Although the
writer was dead at the time of the case, the letter was admitted before the Commission.
In it Treanor stated that the cement industry "must systematically restrain competition
or be ruined." 68 Sup. Ct. at 806.
67. A comparison of the Court's language in the two cases makes this difference
appear clearly.
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usual price results. The Court there said that "this record wholly fails to
establish, either directly or by inference, any concerted action other than that
involved in the gathering and dissemination of pertinent information with
respect to the sale and distribution of cement . . .. ; and it fails to show any
effect on price and production except such as would naturally flow from the
dissemination of that information in the trade and its natural influence on
individual action." 68 In the new Cement case economists testifying as expert
witnesses stated that identity of delivered prices resulting from the use of a
basing-point system was not necessarily the result of agreement among the
members of the industry.69 Other economists testified that the system as em-
ployed by the cement companies could only result from collusive action.70 The
Court,. after considering these conflicting views, did not hold that it.was im-
possible for the system to exist without collusion, but it indicated strong
doubts as to such a possibility: "It may possibly be true . . . that cement pro-
ducers will, without agreement express or implied and without understanding
explicit or tacit, always and at all times . . . charge for their cement precisely,
to the fractional *part of a penny, the price their competitors charge. Cer-
tainly it runs counter to what many people have believed." 71 Similar language
was used by the circuit court of appeals in United States Maltsters Ass'n s.
Federal Trade Commlnjssio0n7 2 and in Milk and Ice Cream Can Institute v. Fed-
eral Trade Commission.73 On the other hand the same circuit court, in revers-
ing the Commission in the new Cement decision found that the evidence was in-
sufficient to support a finding of agreement or understanding to employ the
system.74 Even the Commission itself was careful to point out that it had
not attacked the basing-point system per se, and that it was not inferring
agreement from the system alone, but from the steps taken to enforce it.75 "
The Commission, then, admits that identity of price merely establishes
that a basing-point system was used, and not that there was necessarily an
agreement or understanding to use it. If the existence of an agreement or
68. 268 U. S. 588, 606, 45 Sup. Ct. 586, 69 L. Ed. 1104 (1925).
69. For names of the witnesses so testifying see 37 F. T. C. 87, 250 (1943).
70. Ibid.
71. 68 Sup. Ct. at 810.
72. "Any other conclusion [than that of agreement to fix prices] would do violence
to common sense and the realities of the situation. The fact that petitioners utilized a
system which enabled them to deliver malt at every point of destination at exactly the
same price is a persuasive circumstance in itself." 152 F. 2d 161, 164 (C. C. A. 7th 1945).
73. "Just how such an unnatural situation could be brought about by members of an
industry without a plan or agreement is difficult, if not impossible, to visualize. The mere
fact that the situation did exist in and of itself furnishes strong support that the Institute
and its members were acting cooperatively and by. agreement." 152 F 2d 478, 481
(C. C. A. 7th 1946) (the charge here was not only that freight information was ex-
changed, but also base price information).
74. Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 157 F. 2d 533 (C. C. A.
7th 1946). The court said "Under the circumstances shown, we think it is the inevitable
result of any pricing system that cement must be sold at the same place at a uniform
price whether it be at the point of production or that of destination." Id. at 568.
75. Brief for Commission, cited 68 Sup. Ct. at 819, n. 6.
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understanding is necessary to the condemnation of the practice, it becomes
important to examine the evidentiary facts upon which the Commission based
its finding of concerted action.76 The Commission made many findings to sup-
port its factual conclusion,7.7 but the Court did not find it necessary to enumer-
ate them all in order to sustain the charge of agreement. Boycotts of members
who failed to follow the system; discharge of uncooperative employees; or-
ganized opposition to the establishment of new cement plants; establishment
of punitive base points; discouragement of shipping of cement by truck or
barge; and preparation and distribution of freight rate books were enough to
convince the Court that the Commission's findings were supported by sufficient
evidence. 78
How do the facts enumerated by the Court tend to show concerted action
among respondents relative to the use of the basing-point system? In the case
of punitive base prices,79 the first mill to set such a price at a recalcitrant mill
would seem to be in an indefensible position under the Robinson-Patman
Act.8 0 Other mills, however, if they hop6 to sell their products in the area
controlled by this base must promptly meet this punitive lirice and maintain
it until the offender has conformed to the established pricing system, so that
no inference of any agreement at all would be justified from such a situation.
However, when all mills quickly boost prices back to a higher than normal
level when the offending mill capitulates, an inference of tacit understanding
would seem to be reasonable.8 '
Organized opposition to the erection of new plants might well support
a finding of the existence of a general combination in restraint of trade, rather
than a specific agreement to employ the basing-point system. Similarly, the
action of the association in preparing and distributing rate books is certainly
concerted action-any act of the association must be interpreted as such-but
76. The case of Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 168 F.
2d 175 (C. C. A. 7th 1948), raises a doubt as to whether agreement or understanding is
necessary to outlaw the basing-point system. The court interprets the Ceenct decision
to mean that it is an unfair method of competition for an individual to use a multiple
basing-point system with knowledge that all others in the industry are using the same
system. Id. at 180-181.
77. The findings of the Commission are included under 26 separate paragraphs, and
fill 134 pages. 37 F. T. C. 87, 124-258 (1943).
78. 68 Sup. Ct. at 808.
79. When one seller fails to follow the established procedure, another mill may set a
low base price at the recalcitrant's mill. All of the latter's sales will then have to be made
at a low mill net, perhaps at a loss; whereas only a portion of competitor's sales will be
made at this low price. Such a low price is called a "punitive" base. It is usually set by
one of the normal price leaders of an industry. Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 157 F. 2d 533, 565 (C. C. A. 7th 1946). The Supreme Court indi[
cated that the action normally was concerted: "Other producers made the recalcitrant's
plant an involuntary base point." 68 Sup. Ct. at 810.
80. The Act allows price discriminations made in good faith to meet competition, but
it would not allow discrimination to effect a lower price than a competitor. Note 26, slupra.
81. The example cited by the Court showed that where the established base price
was $1.45 per barrel, a punitive base of 75 cents was established, and after capitulation of
the offending mill the base price rose to $1.75 per barrel. 68 Sup. Ct. at 810.
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the question here is whether or not this action is part of an agreement to main-
tain the basing-point system. Prior to the formation of the association, it was
necessary for each mill to determine freight charges for itself. This entailed
a great deal of work and expense and made it difficult to give an immediate
quotation to a prospective buyer. The association could perform this service
for all its members at a great saving of time and money. If no basing-point
system existed, it would hardly be an improper or useless activity for the as-
sociation to prepare and distribute general freight and transportation informa-
tion to its members for their convenience. 82 Thus the compilation and dis-.
tribution of such information does not necessarily raise an inference that it
is done as part of an agreement to utilize a basing-point system. In both the
Maple Flooring83 and Old,Cement 84 cases a similar freight booklet was dis-
tributed by the associations involved, and in neither case did the Court find
that this fact meant there was concerted action in maintaining the basing-point
system. In neither of these cases, prosecuted under the Sherman Act, was
there a charge of agreement, but in both the Court discussed the possibility
that agreement was a necessary inference from the facts, and rejected it.
Discouragement of shipments by truck or barge, and boycotts of members
who dealt in low-cost foreign cement might support an inference of agreement
to utilize a basing-point system, though such an inference is not a necessary
one. Opposition to shipments by non-rail means could be explained on the
same basis as the association's activity in distributing freight rate books-
that is, convenience. Because of the great number of truck lines and independ-
ent operators, it would be an almost impossible task to prepare a freight
booklet covering all truckers; therefore truck rates would have to be figured
by the individual seller. On the other hand it cannot be denied that the use
of different modes of shipment, with correspondingly different transportation
costs, would make it much more difficult for competitors to know just what
price other sellers were quoting to a buyer, and the basing-point system would
tend to break down on an industry-wide scale.8_5 A similar result would follow
when a seller insisted on bringing in low-cost foreign cement. The basing-
point system would be seriously damaged if variable selling prices were intro-
82. Exchange of basic price information was condemned in American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, 42 Sup. Ct. 114, '66 L. Ed. 284 (1921).
However, even here Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting, remarked that "I should have
supposed that the Sherman Act did not set itself against knowledge .... A combination
to get and distribute such knowledge, notwithstanding its tendency to equalize . . .
prices, is far from a combination in unreasonable restraint of trade." Id. at 412. Compare
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 449, 40 Sup. Ct. 293, 64 L. Ed.
343 (1920). But see United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371, 43 Sup.
Ct. 607, 67 L. Ed. 1035 (1923).
83. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 45 Sup. Ct. 578,
69 L. Ed. 1093 (1925).
84. Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 588, 45 Sup. Ct. 586,
69 L. Ed. 1104 (1925).
85. BURNs, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 311, 322 (1936).
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duced into the picture. Therefore, refusal to ship by truck, and boycotts of
dealers in foreign cement would directly assist in the maintenance of the
basing-point system by contributing to the stability of the pricing factors.
The significance of discharging uncooperative employees would depend
upon the area of non-cooperation. In the Cement case this finding seems to
be direct evidence of agreement to maintain the basing-point system. The
general manager and the sales manager of Aetna Portland Cement Co. were
discharged or persuaded to resign because they failed to follow the established
system. The president of Aetna wrote letters to the two employees and in-
formed them that he had agreed, in meetings with heads of other cement
companies,'that Aetna would cooperate. The competence of the two employees
does not appear to -have been questioned, for under their leadership Aetna
had prospered to the extent that it was operating at 70%o" of capacity, whereas
the industry generally was operating at only 23% of capacity.8 6
Thus of the facts relied upon by the Court, some may support no infer-
ence of any agreement, some suggest a general agreement to restrain compe-
tition, others logically indicate that there was a specific understanding to make
the basing-point system work, and one seems to offer direct proof of such
agreement. Such are the facts which were deemed sufficient to condemn the
use of a basing-point system in an industry.
(3) Hindrance or restraint of competition
Admitting that the charge of agreement to maintain a basing-point system
was proved, there is still a question as to whether the system restrained or
hindered competition as charged by the Commission. The industry argues
that the use of a basing-point system actually promotes wider competition,
since through freight absorption a given mill is enabled to go outside its
natural area and compete with others in their own areas. The alternative, f.o.b.
mill pricing, they argue, would result in a natural monopoly for each mill
within that area where it had a geographical advahtage, and would virtually
end competition except upon the narrow fringe where areas meet.8 7 The cir-
cuit court of appeals accepted this argument when it reversed the Commission
on this point.8 8 The Supreme Court was not greatly impressed with the argu-
ment that the systeni resulted in wider competition in a given area, when the
prices quoted by all competitors were identical in each instance. The only way
in which a mill which accepted the basing-point system could actually quote
a lower price to a customer in the natural area of another mill would be for
86. 37 F. T. C. 87, 187-190 (1943).
87. See FETTER, THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY 282-299 (1931) for a discussion
of the factors affecting this boundary of competition.
88. Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 157 F. 2d 533, 563
(C. C. A. 7th 1946).
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such mill to lower its own base price at the site of the other mill, thus indulging
in a clear form of local price-cutting, or to lower its own mill base price so
as to expand the area controlled by its home base. To lower the base at a
competitor's mill would be to invite retaliation and run the risk of losing
profits from sales within one's own area; to lower one's own base considerably
would be to impose a punitive base price upon oneself. Under such circum-
stances the probability of real price competition is not 'great.8 9 Rather, the
tendency seems to be to keep one's own base price as high as possible, so as
to exact the highest possible profit from sales in one's immediate neighbor-
hood, and then absorb freight as necessary to sell in areas of other mills.
Lowering the base price under the system does not really affect the size of
the area in which a mill may sell its product, since a mill can, without changing
its base price, sell wherever it chooses on equal terms with all other mills.
If mills were required to set a single f.o.b. mill price to all customers, the
only way in which a given mill could expand its sales territory would be to
reduce its price to all customers. This, apparently in the view of the Federal
Trade Commission and certain economists, is the only way in which true price
competition. can come about, since it is the only situation in which there
is a true incentive for mills to quote lower prices. 90
Evidence establishes the fact that in times of economic stress, oi a
"buyers' market," when the desire to sell cement is great, the system tends
to break up on the rocks of individual price competition. This indicates that
the basing-point system, so long as it is working, keeps prices at a level high
enough to tempt individual firms to "cheat" on the system when times are
hard.91 This combination of facts would seem to justify a finding that the
system does act to restrain and hinder price competition among the mills
employing it. Indeed, it may be argued that an agreement to employ a formula
method of arriving at prices is a conspiracy to fix prices which is clearly
illegal under the Sherman Act regardless of the actual economic effect of the
combination.9 2 But so long as each mill is free to set its own base prices without
consulting anyone else, i.e., so long as each is free to fix its own pricing
89. "[I]t reduces the incentive the seller has to reduce the price charged to consumers
in order to expand sales . . .and instead puts him in a position in which it is very gen-
erally cheaper for him to expand or protect his volume of sales by reaching out farther
from his mill, absorbing freight to a greater distance and accepting a lower mill yield on
his additional sales without cutting prices to a consumer." NRA, REPORT ON THE OPERA-
TION OF THE BASING POINT SYSTEM IN THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY 71 (1934) ; BURNS,
THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 336-338 (1936)..
90. FETTER, THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY 278-299, esp. 298 (1931); and see
NPA REPORT supra note 89.
91. That cement price fluctuation was practically nil, see FTC, PRicE BASES INQUIRY(1932).
92. The Supreme Court has said that "Any combination which tampers with price
structures is engaged in an unlawful activity." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U. S. 150, 221, 60 Sup. Ct. 811, 84 L. Ed. 1129 (1940). It would not be unreasonable
to claim that an agreement to maintain a basing-point system was an agreement con-
cerning prices, whether or not it be an agreement to "fix" or "tamper" with them.
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factors, it is questionable whether an agreement to use a pricing formula is
an agreement to fix prices.
(4) Violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act
Respondent Marquette Cement Co. argued that if all the facts found
by the Commission were accepted as true, there would still be no unfair
method of competition, but rather a combination in restraint of trade, and that
the Commission had no power to institute proceedings against activities which
violate the Sherman Act.93 Had this contention been upheld, industries under
attack by the Commission would have acquired a dilatory resource of the
first magnitude.9 4 The contention, found by the Court to be without merit,
represents an interesting about-face in industry's arguments as to the juris-
diction of the Commission. In the early days of the Commission's existence
there was considerable discussion of what constituted an "unfair method of
competition" within the purview of the Federal Trade Commission Act. It
was then'argued that the Act merely set up a new agency to enforce existing
substantive law; that the Commission could only institute proceedings against
practices which were prohibited by the Sherman Act or the common law,
and was without authority to declare other activities unlawful.9 5 This position
did not prevail, and it was accepted that the Commission had power to go
outside the existing judicial pronouncements as to unfairness in competition
and to outlaw other practices which it, in its informed judgment, found to be
prejudicial to fair competition, 6 subject always to court review as to the
reasonableness of the conclusion from the evidence presented. In the Ceinent
case Marquette sought to take another step in the evolution of the Commis-
sion's jurisdiction by arguing that it included only those activities which were
outside the scope of the Sherman Act, rather than being limited to those which
were within the compass of that statute. The Court, quite properly in the
light of existing authority,97 rejected Marquette's contention and held squarely
that any conduct which constituted a restraint of trade under section 1 of
the Sherman Act would also be an unfair method of competition so as to
empower the Trade Commission to proceed under section 5 of its parent Act.
93. 68 Sup. Ct. at 798.
94. "We can conceive of no greater obstacle which this Court could create to the
fulfillment of these congressional purposes than to inject into every Trade Commission
proceeding... a possible jurisdictional question." Id. at 799-800.
95. "Petitioner urges that ... section 5 must be held void for indefiniteness unless
the words 'unfair methods of competition' be construed to embrace no more than acts
which on September 26, 1914, when Congress spoke, were identifiable as acts of unfair
trade." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 Fed. 307, 311 (C. C. A.
7th 1919).
96. Federal Trade Commission v. Keppel, 291 U. S. 304, 310, 54 Sup. Ct. 423, 78
L. Ed. 814 (1934).
97. Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U. S. 457, 463,
61 Sup. Ct. 703, 85 L. Ed. 949 (1941).
B. Count 2: Price Discriminatiou under the Robinson-Patinan Act
When the Robinson-Patman amendment to the Clayton Act was first
presented to Congress, it contained a provision which would have required'
sellers to charge a single mill price to all buyers in order to avoid a charge
of price discrimination. The result would have been expressly to outlaw a
delivered price system such as the basing-point method. 98 The provision was
much debated on the floor, and was stricken out by the House Judiciary Com-
mittee in order to get the remainder of the bill approved. 99 With the pro-
vision eliminated, it was the belief of some members of Congress that the
Act was not intended to affect basing-point systems at all.100 This argument
was strongly pressed in the Corn Products'0 ' and Staley102 cases. In those
cases the Court answered this contention by stating that the provision which
was eliminated would have forbidden all delivered-price systems. The Con-
gress was unwilling to take such a drastic step, and preferred to leave each
system to be considered on its individual nierits under section. 2(a) of the
amended Clayton Act.10 3 The position of the Court seems sound, in view of
the fact that congressional opinion was divided on the matter.
10 4
(1) The meaning of discrimination
The economic and legal, definitions of the term "discrimination" are not
identical. Price differentials between buyers, not based upon differences of
costs would be discriminatory under both concepts. However, identity of de-
livered prices, when accompanied by cost differentials, would also be dis-
criminatory in the view of the economist ;105 whereas identical prices appear
not to come within the legislative definition of discrimination regardless of
comparative costs in placing the goods in the hands of consumers. 1 6 Not all
price differentials are legally discriminatory. The Robinson-Patman Act spe-
98. See note 7 supra. "In effect, this provision of the bill is designed to put an end
to price discrimination through the medium of the basing-point or delivered-price system
of selling commodities. It will require the use of the f.o.b. method of sale." Report of the
House Judiciary Committee on the Patman Bill, H. R. RFP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
14 (1936).
99. 80 CONG. REc. 8102, 8138, 8224 (1936).
100. Id. at 8102, 8138, 8220, 9903.
101. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U. S. 726, 65
Sup. Ct. 971, 89 L. Ed. 1320 (1945).
102. Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746, 65 Sup. Ct.
971, 89 L. Ed. 1338 (1945).
103. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U. S. 726.
737, 65 Sup. Ct. 971, 89 L. Ed. 1320 (1945).
104. Rep. Patman, who sponsored the bill in the House, suggests that the bill
would cover basing-point systems under proper circumstances, even after the section in
question was stricken out. PATMAN, THE ROBINSON-PATrAN ACT 114 (1938).
105. FETTER, THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY 382 (1931).
106. Rep. Patman listed a number of inquiries which he had received concerning
the meaning of the bill. The question as to whether a seller could set one price for all
customers and make no allowances for transportation differences was repeatedly asked
and answered in the affirmative. PATMAIN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 114-118 (1938).
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cifically provides that differences in price due to differences in cost of manu-
facture, sale or delivery are not prohibited by the Act.10 7
Furthermore, price differentials, though they may be discriminatory
from a legal point of view, are not necessarily prohibited by the Robinson-
Patman Act. It is necessary to establish that the discriminations lessen compe-
tition, tend to create monopoly or prevent or injure competition among
persons who either grant or knowingly receive the benefits of the discrimi-
nation.' 08
Finally, even if there is discrimination, and it does have the proscribed
effect on competition, the action may still not fall within the ban of the Act
if the seller can show that the discriminatory price was made in good faith
to meet competition.10 9
(2) Discrimination in the Cement case
There seems to be little question but that the basing-point system as
employed in the cement industry did result in price differentials among various
customers, and that these differentials were not the result of any of the factors
which would excuse them under the Act. Consequently, the only real question
arises from a consideration of whether the discriminations were made in good
faith to meet competition, and whether they had the proscribed effect on
competition.
The Corn Products and Staley cases considered at length the question of
good faith in meeting competition. 10 The former case held that a single
basing-point system employed by a single manufacturer who shipped from
more than one plant resulted in illegal price discrimination. The opinion
clearly held that collection of "phiantom freight" was illegal, but it did not
make entirely clear whether freight absorption was prohibited. The Staley
case held that a company could not adopt a competitor's basing-point system
and justify it under the "good faith" proviso. The Court in the Cement case
stated that "the combined effect of the two cases was to forbid the adoption
for sales purposes of any basing point pricing system." 111 This broad language
does not seem to be justified by the two cases. The illegal effect upon compe-
tition in those cases lay in the fact that the buyers were in competition with
each other, and discriminations in price to these competing buyers resulted in
injury to their competition. In the Cement case the picture is quite different.
Purchasers of cement, are not, generally speaking, competitors. 112 Cement is
107. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1941).
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Supra notes 102, 103. The meaning of these cases is discussed in Aulette and
Schaffer, Legality of the "Basing Point" Pricing System, 33 GEo. L. J. 439 (1945).
111. 68 Sup. Ct. at 814.
112. A general discussion of the characteristics of the cement industry, both as to
producers and consumers may be found in the opinion of the circuit court of appeals in
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used where it is received, and is not generally converted into a manufactured
product which competes with others in the ordinary channels of trade. There-
fore, the injury to competition must be found to exist in the relations between
the seller and his competitors. Such injury is ordinarily much more difficult
to establish than in the case where the competition affected is that which
exists between buyers. Of course, in the Cement case the Federal Trade
Commission had found that the basing-point system had hindered and re-
strained competition between respondents when it was considering the unfair
competition charge." 3 This finding, together with the holding in the Corn
Products and Staley cases, clearly brings the cement practice within the ban
of the Robinson-Patman Act. It would seem however that a basing-point
system not maintained by agreement or understanding with competitors, and
not selling to buyers who were themselves competitors, would be legal under
these decisions. However, the more recent Triangle Conduit case" 4 casts doubt
upon this conclusion, since the court there apparently found a forbidden
element of conspiracy in the individual use of a basing-point system with
knowledge that others were using the same system.
CONCLUSION
The trend of the cases is toward a requirement of uniform f.o.b. mill
prices to all buyers, but this position has not yet been reached. Zone pricing
systems, like basing-point systems, are vulnerable under the Robinson-Patman
Act, provided the buyers are in competition with each other. A universal de-
livered-price system, not maintained by agreement with competitors, would
seem to be safe so long as the Court holds that "price" as used in the Robinson-
Patman Act may mean delivered price." 5 However, should the Court decide
that "price" means only mill net, the universal delivered price would also fall
within the ban of the Act.
It seems likely that basing-point systems will soon be condemned per se.
Possibly such a holding will not be necessary to eliminate the system. Recent
developments indicate that major industries may abandon it rather than face
possible conviction of a violation of the law. The steel industry changed to
an f.o.b. mill pricing method because "the industry's top legal brains believed
the decision would apply to the steel industry-that, consequently, the move
was necessary in order to keep from breaking the law." 116 Steel regarded the
decision in the Cement case as the "crowning blow" in the campaign of
the Cement case. Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 157 F.
2d 533, 539-540 (C. C. A. 7th 1946).
113. Finding 26, 37 F. T. C. 87, 257 (1943).
114. Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 168 F. 2d 175,
181 (C. C. A. 7th 1948).
115. See N. A. M. LAw DIGEST 43 (June, 1948).
116. Iron Age, Sept. 2, 1948, p. 119.
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"pernicious pressure" which the Trade Commission had waged against the
system. 117 Since the industry had abandoned the system, United States Steel
gave up what was apparently a lost cause, and submitted to entry of a consent
decree iri the original case which arose before the Commission concerning
"Pittsburgh-Plus" in 1924.118 The Corporation agreed to adhere to a pricing
method which would not conflict with requirements of the Commission.
Thus, industry appears to have admitted defeat in the courts, and is now
turning to Congress." 9 The Capehart committee was appointed to investigate
the impact of the decision upon both large and small business. The recent
elections indicate that there is no immediate prospect for less stringent anti-
trust laws; however, it is to be presumed that the committee will make findings
and recommendations to Congress. Even if all should be agreed that the
basing-point method should be rescued by legislative action, there is a serious
problem of draftsmanship facing the lawmakers. Changes in the Robinson-
Patman Act to allow price discrimination between buyers located in- different
areas would be relatively simple to draft, but a much more difficult problem
is encountered in the Federal Trade Commission Act. In view of the wide
latitude allowed the Commission in defining unfair methods of competition,
and-the nature of the evidentiary facts upon which the Commission has found
concerted action, it would seem that only a carefully drawn statute, specifically
describing the basing-point system, and expressly exempting it from the ban
of the Trade Commission Act would successfully rescue the system.
CLYDr L. BALL
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118. Time, Oct. 18, 1948, p. 91.
119. Irvin S. Olds, Chairman of United States Steel Corp., stated that the matter
"should receive the attention of Congress." N. Y. Times, April 25, 1948, p. 41, col. 8,
E. T. Weir, Chairman of National Steel Corporation, suggested that Congress should
step into the picture and save the system. WEIR, MULTIPLE BASING POINT METHOD IN THE
STEEL INDUSTRY (mimeographed pamphlet privately distributed, 1948). A Congressional
committee has been appointed to study the effect of the decision upon business. Iron
Age, Oct. 7, 1948, p. 155.
